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OVERDETERMINED ATROCITIES 
 
 
 
James G. Stewart* 
 
 
 An event is over-determined if there are multiple sufficient 
causes for its occurrence. A firing squad is a classic illustration. If 
eight soldiers are convened to execute a prisoner, they can all walk 
away afterwards in the moral comfort that “I didn’t really make a 
difference; it would have happened without me.” The difficulty is, 
if we are only responsible for making a difference to harm 
occurring in the world, none of the soldiers are responsible for the 
death—none made, either directly or through others, an essential 
contribution to the death. In many respects, this dilemma is the 
leitmotif for individual responsibility in a globalized world, where 
criminal harm is so frequently occasioned by collectives. In order 
to assess the various solutions offered for the overdetermination 
problem in criminal theory, this paper reconsiders arguments for 
and against requiring causation in criminal responsibility, 
competing theoretical accounts of causation and the various 
unsatisfactory explanations for overdetermination presently on 
offer. While the paper uses examples from international criminal 
justice as illustrations, it concludes that overdetermination is a 
central moral problem of our time. A range of significant 
consequences follow for the theory and practice of international 
criminal law. 
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For Antonio Cassese. An essential contribution. Directly, and 
through others. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
 An event is overdetermined if there are multiple sufficient 
causes for its occurrence. A firing squad offers a classic 
illustration. If eight soldiers are lined up to execute a blindfolded 
prisoner and all shoot at the same time, none of the soldiers makes 
a difference to the plight of the slain victim; she would have died 
regardless of whether any one of the soldiers participated or not. 
So even if one of the shooters had refused to fire, seven other 
bullets would still have found their mark and ended the prisoner’s 
life in a more or less indistinguishable manner. Indeed, the firing 
squad was designed and constituted so as to allow each of the 
soldiers who participated to walk away in the moral comfort that, 
“I didn’t really make a difference; it would have happened without 
me.” The difficulty is, if we are only responsible for making a 
difference to harm occurring in the world, none of the soldiers are 
responsible for the death—none made, either directly or through 
others, an essential contribution. 
 This moral quandary is, by and large, the leitmotif for 
international criminal justice. Very few atrocities are so dependent 
on the acts of any one individual that we can say with confidence 
that they would certainly not have transpired absent any one 
accused’s individual agency. In fact, if there were one overarching 
tension in the ongoing struggle for defensible standards of blame 
attribution in this discipline, it might be between our exclusive 
focus on individual accountability and the pervasive influence of 
collectivities that furnish a long line of willing substitute 
perpetrators, thereby diluting the significance of individual agency 
upon which criminal liability is predicated. Thus, 
overdetermination presents a moral problem whose impact is 
profound for international trials, even if overdetermined atrocities 
arguably come in a variety of different forms.  
 In fact, there are four potential variants that help illustrate the 
problematic. The first is epitomized by the fire bombing of 
Dresden by Allied pilots during World War II. Over three 
inglorious days in February 1945, the Allies flew three bombing 
raids over Dresden, deliberately generating a firestorm that brutally 
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killed civilians in the tens of thousands.1 The analogy with the 
firing squad motif is very direct. As Christopher Kutz ably argues, 
the estimated 8,000 crewmen who flew over 1,000 sorties over 
Dresden made little real difference individually: ‘Each crewman’s 
causal contribution to the conflagration, indeed each plane’s, was 
marginal to the point of insignificance.’2 As a result, each of the 
pilots could later safely claim that they did not personally make a 
difference to the way the atrocity transpired—meaning perversely, 
that no one was responsible for it. 
 The Dresden pilots form the classic illustration of 
overdetermination, which approximates to the firing squad most 
closely. First, they are perpetrators not accomplices. In discussing 
the differentiated model of attribution presently in place 
internationally, George Fletcher states that “[p]erpetrators or 
principals are those who are directly liable for the violation of a 
norm; accessories are those who are derivatively liable.”3 In this 
instance, the pilots are perpetrators because they dropped the 
bombs, that precipitated the firestorm, that destroyed so many 
civilians. Their culpability is not contingent on that of others, 
meaning that they are best described as perpetrating the death by 
smoke inhalation, fire and asphyxiation that ensued. Second, they 
form part of a single highly ordered organizational structure that 
shared a definite and dark common goal. 
 Western businesspeople operating in apartheid South Africa 
offer a related but distinct variant. At the end of its arduous work, 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
concluded that ‘[c]ertain businesses were involved in helping to 
design and implement apartheid policies. Other businesses 
benefited from cooperating with the security structures of the 
former state.’4 Many of these actions constituted complicity in or 
direct perpetration of crimes. Of course, the difficulty here too is 
that the actions of any one business were fungible for the conduct 
                                                
1 For a concise history, see C. Kutz, Complicity: ethics and law for a collective 
age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), at 116–123. 
2 Id. at 118. 
3 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 636 (1978); In a separate 
work, I argue again the differentiated model this definition assumes, but I accept 
that model international criminal justice does not adopt a model like that I 
advocate for. James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for 
International Crimes, 25 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165–219 
(2012). 
4 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Volume 4, Chapter 
2, “Institutional Hearing: Business and Labor, Principles Arising out of Business 
Sector Hearings,” 161. N. Clark, Manufacturing Apartheid: State Corporations 
in South Africa (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994). 
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of corporations as a class; if specific companies had not 
participated it would merely have left an economic vacuum others 
would certainly have filled. Drawing on this reality, a number of 
US companies sued under the Alien Tort Statute complained that 
without their input, it was only the case that “apartheid would not 
have occurred in the same way.”5 The implication is plain; these 
particular companies did not cause anything. 
 On one level, this replicates the Dresden bombing campaign. If 
a company’s board passed a motion to assist apartheid crimes by a 
bare minimum (e.g. 8 votes to 7 in a corporate board with 15 
members), then each board member who cast an affirmative vote 
did make a difference to the downstream consequences, but in any 
other voting configuration, the company would have acted as it did 
regardless of any individual vote. And structurally speaking, 
corporations are organizations too, so the example differs little at 
the level of board deliberations. Focusing on the corporation itself, 
however, yields different results. To borrow from Tracy Isaacs, 
companies like those operating in apartheid South Africa are just a 
mereological sum; a notional composite of a random collection of 
things.6 Thus, overdetermination not only arises within 
organizations, it also has relevance for groups that are only very 
loosely constituted. 
 Perhaps unwittingly, the International Criminal Court’s first 
judgment stumbles upon a third possible type of 
overdetermination. In convicting Thomas Lubanga for recruiting 
and using child solders, the majority seized upon his essential 
contribution to the crimes as a basis for describing the warlord’s 
responsibility as that of co-perpetration rather than mere 
complicity,7 whereas at least one dissenting judge disputed 
whether an essential contribution was required.8 Both sides of the 
debate miss the wider point that these crimes would probably have 
happened anyway. As Lubanga’s counsel put it, Lubanga’s role 
was in no way determinative of the crime of recruiting child 
soldiers, “for the simple reason that the soldiers who appointed 
                                                
5 Complaint, Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, (No. 07-919) 128 S. Ct. 2424 - 
Supreme Court 2008, at 4. 
6 TRACY ISAACS, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN COLLECTIVE CONTEXTS 27 (2011). 
7 Judgement, Prosecutor v. Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06) Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute. 14 March 2012, § 925 (“Lubanga”); “only those to 
whom essential tasks have been assigned – and who, consequently, have the 
power to frustrate the commission of the crime by not performing their tasks – 
can be said to have joint control over the crime”.) 
8 Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fulford, Lubanga, supra note 
7, § 15. 
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him as leader did not need him.”9 How do we hold Lubanga 
responsible at all, if his conduct made no difference? 
 The example raises distinct issues again. First, many would 
describe this scenario as pre-emptive (not overdetemined) 
causation. Maybe some other military commander would have 
stepped into Lubanga’s shoes had he declined the leadership 
position, but that is quite different from the firing squad. Lubanga 
did commit these crimes, and whether or not someone else would 
have in the future is entirely speculative. As we will soon see, this 
argument and the normative distinction it depends upon is one of 
the key issues with which we must wrestle, but to foreshadow what 
is to come, the distinction is more difficult to justify than first 
meets the eye. Second, and equally importantly, Lubanga’s 
example demonstrates that the conceptual problems with which we 
will soon toil are not limited to crimes committed by “small fish.” 
Lubanga was a leader at the head of a military unit responsible for 
atrocities.   
 The arms vendor Viktor Bout, aptly nicknamed the Merchant 
of Death, presents a fourth and final variant.10 After the end of the 
Cold War, Bout trafficked guns to the most brutal conflicts with 
reckless abandon. For example, at one point during the Angolan 
war, UN Panels of Experts cited Bout as selling weapons to both 
sides of a brutal conflict that had spanned four decades, killing at 
least 500,000 civilians.11 Many years later, he would stand trial in 
the United States for attempting to sell weapons to the FARC in 
Colombia (which paralleled the Lubanga trial insofar as Bout’s 
true criminal responsibility went seriously under-represented).12 
                                                
9 Defence Closing Statements (Open Session), Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-T-
357), Trial Chamber I, August 26, 2011, 30, lines 2-5. I in no way vouch for the 
factual veracity of this argument. 
10 For an overview, see D. Farah and S. Braun, Merchant of Death  : money, guns, 
planes, and the man who makes war possible, (New York: Wiley, 2007); 
discussing Bout’s various misadventures in the context of the arms trade 
generally, A. Feinstein, The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade 
(London: MacMillan, 2011), 154–164. 
11 For engaging histories of the conflict, including the role of arms vendors and 
extractive industries, see T. Hodges, Angola: the anatomy of an oil state. (2nd 
ed. London: James Currey, 2004); K. Maier, Angola Promises And Lies 
(London: Interlink, 2002). Estimates of deaths from the conflict range from 
500,000 to 1.2 million people, with millions more displaced internally: 
International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Angola’s Choice: Reform or Regress’ 61 
Africa Report (Luanda/Brussels: ICG, 2003).  
12 N. Rosenberg, 'Viktor Bout Guilty in Arms-Trafficking Case', The New York 
Times, (2 November 2011), accessible at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/nyregion/viktor-bout-guilty-in-arms-
trafficking-case.html (last visited Jul 23, 2012). 
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Subsequent to his conviction, Bout offered new reflections on his 
earlier role in Angola. Predictably, he too explained away all 
responsibility by appealing to the firing squad motif: “If I didn’t do 
it, someone else would.”13 And it is difficult to contradict him, 
knowing the global market in weaponry as we do. 
 Contrary to the other three examples, Bout is clearly an 
accomplice. I am of the view that the accomplice liability of arms 
vendors is philosophically defensible on an appropriate account of 
complicity, although I accept that some would contest this.14  
Indeed, after WWII, corporate officers were prosecuted as 
accomplices for selling the means used to asphyxiate civilians at 
Auschwitz,15 and modern courts have also begun to use complicity 
to call businesspeople to account for knowingly transferring 
weapons to recipients who use them to carry out atrocities.16 
Unlike the surprisingly large mereological group of companies that 
were prepared to do business with an apartheid regime that was 
sanctioned, denounced and opposed throughout the West, only a 
much smaller set of arms vendors could have sold weapons to 
armed groups in Angola at the time. Bout was a pre-emptive 
accomplice within a small mereological group. 
 How then does international criminal justice deal with the 
various moral problems these examples engender? The answer is, 
inadequately. At the level of doctrine, for accomplices such as 
Bout, the position is that “[a]lthough the accused’s conduct need 
not have been a condition sine qua non of the commission of the 
                                                
13 N. Schmidle, 'Disarming Viktor Bout', The New Yorker (5 March 2012), 
available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/03/05/120305fa_fact_schmidle (last 
visited 4 June, 2012). 
14 I concede that this point is not beyond dispute as a matter of criminal theory. 
See R A Duff, “Can I help you?” accessorial liability and the intention to 
assist, 10 LEGAL STUDIES 165–181 (1990) (arguing that using complicity in the 
ordinary course of business is structurally akin to omission liability since it 
requires the businessperson to break with their usual course of conduct).  For 
different views that use arms vendors as examples of accessorial liability, see 
John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. LAW AND PHILOS. 127–141 
(2007); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE 
AGE (2000). 
15 Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), British Military 
Court, Hamburg, 1 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals, 93 (March 8, 1946). 
16 Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, Netherlands, LJN: BA6734, Gerechtshof ‘s-
Gravenhage , 2200050906-2, (May 9, 2007) (charging Frans Van Anraat with 
complicity in genocide and war crimes for selling chemical weapons to Saddam 
Hussein, that were ultimately used to gas civilians); Prosecutor v. 
Kouwenhoven, Netherlands, LJN: AY5160, Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage , 
09/750001-05 (July 28, 2006) (charging Guus Kouwenhoven with complicity in 
international crimes perpetrated by Charles Taylor’s regime in Liberia). 
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crime, it must have made a difference.”17 And yet, as we will see, 
this language means precious little. Moreover, for co-perpetrators 
such as the Dresden pilots or the businesspeople operating in 
apartheid South Africa, existing international criminal law requires 
that each individual must make an ‘essential contribution… 
resulting in the realization of the objective elements of the 
crime.’18 And yet, perversely, neither an Allied pilot over Dresden 
nor the businessperson in apartheid would satisfy these standards. 
In any event, the core issue across all these examples is really 
causal overdetermination, which presently goes unnoticed as courts 
enthusiastically borrow ‘modes of liability’ from domestic legal 
systems that do not deal with the problem squarely. 
 In fact, there is something quite peculiar about international 
criminal justice as a discipline: causation has escaped direct 
treatment by almost all courts and scholars.19 While we academics 
have expended a considerable effort debating ‘modes of 
liability’,20 very little debate has centered on more fundamental 
concepts that apply regardless of how ‘modes of liability’ are 
configured. This is undoubtedly true of causation. The problem is 
that as soon as one begins the process of unveiling the concept and 
its implications for international trials, one is immediately 
confronted with the problem of overdetermination that has troubled 
philosophers for centuries. Nonetheless, if international criminal 
law is to be rational not intuitive, principled not arbitrary, all 
variations of the problem require defensible solutions.  
 Causal overdetermination also strikes at the heart of 
international criminal justice as a project. In recent years, many 
scholars have come to the view that international criminal law’s 
liberal commitment to locating responsibility in the individual is 
                                                
17 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez ("Kordić ") (IT-95-14/2-T), Trial 
Chamber, 26 February 2001, § 391; Judgment, Prosecutor v. Blaškić (IT-95-14-
T), Trial Chamber, 3 March 2000, § 270: “Although it must be proved that the 
instigation was a clear contributing factor to the commission of the crime, it 
need not be a conditio sine qua non.”. 
18 Lubanga Trial Judgment, para. 925 “only those to whom essential tasks have 
been assigned – and who, consequently, have the power to frustrate the 
commission of the crime by not performing their tasks – can be said to have 
joint control over the crime”. 
19 For a helpful exception, see Darryl Robinson, How command responsibility 
got so complicated: A culpability contradiction, its obfuscation, and a simple 
solution, 13 MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2012). 
20 International criminal courts and tribunals use the term “modes of liability” to 
designate participants in a crime. As I have argued elsewhere, the label is 
conceptually misleading and of uncertain historical pedigree. Domestic systems 
use the labels ‘participation’, ‘parties to a crime’ and more rarely, ‘modes of 
attribution.’ Stewart, supra note 3, fn 2. 
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unavoidably at odds with the collective character of atrocity.21 As 
one of the very best of these scholars argues, “the collective nature 
of atrocity sits uncomfortably with international criminal law’s 
predicate of individual agency, action and authorship.”22 In turn, 
this misgiving has led to serious skepticism about the value of 
international criminal justice as a tool for promoting post-conflict 
justice. Nevertheless, whether individual agency can adequately 
cope with group offending largely depends on the strength of our 
solutions to the problem of causal overdetermination, which goes 
unexplored in the literature that too quickly declares individual 
accountability inadequate.  
 In this essay, I introduce causal overdetermination and theories 
proffered as solutions. Instead of advocating for one or another, I 
hope to start a missing conversation by plotting the extent and 
significance of these issues. To do this, Part I begins by 
highlighting the structural origins of the problem and their genesis 
in the idea that harm and therefore causation matter for 
international criminal responsibility. In Part II, I then plot various 
theories of causation, showing how ‘but for’ causation coupled 
with a restraining auxiliary concept represents the dominant 
understanding of causation in both theory and practice. With this 
background behind us, Part III criticizes the positions adopted for 
dealing with overdetermined causes in international and domestic 
criminal courts alike, highlighting an alternative explanation that 
shows greater promise while raising new concerns. What emerges 
is a keen sense that this problematic cannot be easily resolved or 
ignored. 
 
II. THE STRUCTURAL ORIGINS OF THE CAUSATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
  
                                                
21 George P. Fletcher, Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The 
Problem of Collective Guilt, The, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1514 (2001) (“the liberal 
bias toward individual criminal responsibility obscures basic truths about the 
crimes that now constitute the core of international criminal law. [They] are 
deeds that by their very nature are committed by groups and typically against 
individuals as members of groups.”). 
22 Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Responsibility and Postconflict Justice, in 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 23–60, 1 (Tracy Isaacs & 
Richard Vernon eds., 2011). In fairness to Drumbl, he also raises a range of 
other bases for his criticisms of individual criminal responsibility, including the 
deeply conformist nature of most atrocities and the selectivity of trials that are 
seriously under-inclusive of offenders. 
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 In the firing squad example with which we began, our core 
concern was to isolate who was responsible for bringing about the 
prisoner’s death given multiple sufficient causes. This raises a 
preliminary structural question: why should making a difference to 
harm matter in international criminal law at all? I begin then, by 
situating the problem of overdetermination in the long debates 
about whether causation should matter in determining criminal 
responsibility. As will become apparent, doing so will later help in 
elucidating why overdetermination is such a significant moral 
problem, in pointing out the ways in which international criminal 
justice has inadequately grappled with the challenge, and in 
developing a new explanation of why these types of contribution 
remain culpable despite the premise that the underlying criminal 
harm would have transpired regardless of the conduct of any 
specific accused.  
 Traditionally, criminal offenses are understood as dividing into 
three distinct categories: inchoate crimes, such as attempt, where 
the subjective disposition is the primary ground for responsibility; 
conduct-type crimes, such as rape and fraud, where wrongdoing is 
constituted by the conduct itself;23 and harm-type offences, such as 
murder, where a potentially wide range of actions are prohibited if 
they lead to proscribed harm.24 Under this latter category, lighting 
a cigarette, driving a car, or watching television can serve as the 
ground of responsibility,25 provided there is a causal relationship 
between this conduct and a harm that is criminally prohibited. 
Thus, for these harm-type crimes, the almost universal position in 
extant criminal systems is that “a causal connexion between some 
action of the accused and the specified harm must be shown in 
order to establish the existence of liability.”26 
 Of course, there are those who deny this three-way division, 
arguing that causation is a quintessential element of responsibility 
                                                
23 I do not wish to be understood as implying that rape does not cause 
devastating physiological and psychological harm. I have worked with victims 
of mass rape. The conceptual point is merely that the occurrence of this harm is 
not formally constitutive of rape as an offense, which I believe is appropriate. 
What a horror it would be to have to prove that an act of sexual violence caused 
a particular degree of physical or psychological harm for rape to be established.  
24 Fletcher, supra note 21, at 388-390 (referring to patterns of manifest 
criminality, harmful consequences and subjective criminality). I am grateful to 
Thomas Weigend for pointing out how malleable these categories are.  
25 M. Dan-Cohen, 'Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self', 105 Harvard 
Law Review (1991) 959–1003, at 962. (using the term “ground of responsibility” 
to distinguish object-responsibility and subject-responsibility). 
26 H. L. A Hart and T. Honore Causation in the Law (2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), at 92 (emphasis in original). 
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across all criminal offences. This argument is best made by 
Michael Moore, who implores that “all complex descriptions of 
actions share with ‘killing’ a built-in, second causal element: the 
bodily movement (that is caused by a volition) must itself cause 
some further, independent event to occur, like a death in the case 
of ‘killing’.27 On this account, rape is not restricted to the conduct 
of inserting one’s penis into a woman’s vagina without consent; it 
is brought about by ‘causing sexual penetration of the female.’28 If 
this reading of the philosophy of action is correct, one can never 
escape causal analyses, even for what are commonly known as 
conduct-type crimes. Thus, overdetermination affects all crimes, 
not just harm type offences where causation is indisputably a 
necessary ingredient of criminal responsibility.    
 Others reach the diametrically opposite view. If we are 
committed to punishing people for what they deserve, surely they 
should not benefit from their luck.29 Why, after all, should a 
would-be murderer who shoots at her enemy be punished less, 
merely because the victim by chance dies of a heart attack seconds 
before the bullet hits?30 If we are serious about culpability as the 
metric upon which to judge responsibility, we must eliminate these 
types of fortuitous scenarios from our evaluations of guilt. We 
therefore abolish harm as a morally relevant component of 
criminal responsibility, and as a result, eliminate causation from 
our criminal vocabulary. In its place, criminal offenses would 
always be inchoate in structure (based on the inherit risk of 
morally blameworthy actions), making each member of the firing 
                                                
27  The criticism of the traditionalist division between conduct and harm type 
offenses is best made in MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 101 (2009); But see John 
Gardner, Moore on Complicity and Causation, 156 U. PA L. REV. PENNUMBRA 
432 (2008) (disagreeing that rape requires causation, because the offence 
demands “no result... other than the action in question having been performed”).  
28 MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, 
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS (2009). 
29 For the classic discussion of this in English-speaking literature, see T. Nagel, 
‘Moral Luck’, 50 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume  
(1976), 137-155; For more recent discussion, see A. Ashworth, ‘Taking the 
Consequences’, in S. Shute, J. Gardner, & J. Horder (eds.), Action and Value in 
Criminal Law  (New York: Oxford University Press US, 1995), at 107; also see 
L.Alexander, K.K. Ferzan and S. Morse. Crime and Culpability: A Theory of 
Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), at 171-175. 
30  For an excellent overview of these arguments, see L. Alexander and K. K. 
Ferzan, supra note 29, at 171-196 (arguing that only culpability, not resulting 
harm, affects desert"). For a response to these claims, which asserts the orthodox 
position that harm matters, see M.S. Moore, Causation and Responsibility: An 
Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), at 30. 
2012] OVERDETERMINED ATROCITIES 11 
   
squad guilty of murder for firing the gun at the point they pull the 
trigger. On this account, we solve the problem of 
overdetermination by transcending the structure upon which it 
depends. 
 And yet, international criminal law sides with neither extreme. 
Like it or not, this particular criminal system unquestionably 
makes causing harm a primary element of responsibility for many 
crimes, from deportation as a crime against humanity to 
genocide.31 Moreover, international courts often explicitly 
reinforce the normative significance of harm by stating that many 
international crimes are not inchoate and that liability is contingent 
upon proof that the intended harm materialized.32 At the same 
time, these courts are also unequivocal that for a conduct-type 
crime such as public incitement to genocide, “a causal relationship 
is not requisite to a finding of incitement.”33 For both these 
reasons, our appreciation of the problem of overdetermination in 
international criminal justice must defer to the manner in which 
this set of crimes is constructed.  
 Moreover, there are compelling arguments in favor of this 
partial reliance on causation, despite what exponents of the moral 
luck school suggest. First, our basic intuitions about responsibility, 
                                                
31 For the former, civilians must be expelled across a border; for the latter, 
members of a civilian population must perish. For deportation, the ICC 
Elements of Crimes stipulate that “[t]he perpetrator deported or transferred one 
or more persons to another State or to another location.” Id., at 17. For the latter, 
they indicate that one way of perpetrating the crime requires that “[t]he 
perpetrator killed one or more persons, including by inflicting conditions of life 
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.” ICC Elements 
of Crimes, at 6.  
32 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Milutinoviæ et al., (IT-05-87-T), Trial Chamber, 26 
February. 2009) at 92 (“liability for aiding and abetting under the Statute cannot 
be inchoate: the accused cannot be held responsible under Article 7(1) for aiding 
and abetting if a crime or underlying offence is never actually carried out with 
his assistance, encouragement, or moral support.”); Judgment Prosecutor v. 
Semanza, (ICTR-97-20-T), 15 May 2003,  § 398 (“Article 6(1) does not 
criminalize inchoate offences”.). 
33 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, ¶ 1015 
(Dec. 3, 2003); this aspect of the Trial Chamber’s reasoning was affirmed on 
appeal. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., supra note 76, at 678; for a concise 
articulation of the difference between instigation as mode of liability and 
incitement as inchoate offence, see Prosecutor v. Kalimanzira, Case No. ICTR-
05-88-T, Judgment, ¶ 512 (June 20, 2009) (“Instigation under Article 6 (1) is a 
mode of liability; an accused will incur criminal responsibility only if the 
instigation in fact substantially contributed to the commission of one of the 
crimes under Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute. By contrast, direct and public 
incitement is itself a crime, requiring no demonstration that it in fact contributed 
in any way to the commission of acts of genocide.”). 
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naturally make causing harm a central component of the remorse 
we feel for our actions. We would be appalled by someone who 
treated negligent driving that killed an infant as merely a question 
of poor driving, in the same way that we would view someone who 
blamed themselves for killing an infant when they merely drove 
negligently as psychically imbalanced.34 The reality is that 
“[f]eelings of remorse and guilt are closely connected with causing 
harm, for these feelings are part of a broader pattern of human 
interaction.”35 Consequently, in order to maintain a close 
intersection between morality and criminal responsibility, we have 
to live with the unfortunate downside that is overdetermination.  
 Second, causation also preserves freedom, providing another 
rationale for tolerating the problem. One of the primary concerns 
in the literature on over-criminalization36 is the extent to which 
conduct-type offenses that criminalize inherently risky behaviors 
inhibit freedom of action. Take the criminalization of weapons 
possession. Here, we prohibit possession because of its statistical 
correlation with use for criminal ends, not because it is intrinsically 
harmful. But many argue that a blanket crime of possession is 
over-inclusive, given that it restricts the freedoms of those who 
carry and use arms for non-criminal purposes.37 So by insisting on 
a causal link between proscribed harm and actions of an accused, 
international criminal justice offers only a minimalist intrusion into 
the liberty of risky but otherwise socially desirable practices—
causation ensures that Bout is free to sell weapons to Angolans, 
except where they cause atrocities.38  
                                                
34 S. Wolf, 'The Moral of Moral Luck', in C. Calhoun ed. Setting The Moral 
Compass Essays By Women Philosophers  (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), at 6.. 
35 G. Fletcher.  Rethinking the Criminal Law, (London: Little, Brown, 1978) at 
482 (note also Fletcher’s helpful criticisms of this position, questioning the 
validity of using popular feelings of remorse as foundational for criminal 
responsibility insofar as they may be the product of “neurotic guilt.”). This is 
similar to John Gardner’s argument that using emotions as a basis for criminal 
responsibility depends on how decent the emotions are. J. Gardner, Wrongdoing 
by Results: Moore’s Experiential Argument (2012) 18 Legal Theory 
(forthcoming) (citing irrational emotional prejudices against homosexuality as 
an example of indecent emotions of this type). 
36 S.H. Kadish. Blame and Punishment: Essays in the Criminal Law. (New 
York; London: Macmillan, 1987), at 21-61; D.N. Husak. Overcrimininalization: 
The Limits of the Criminal Law (New York: Macmillan, 2008).  
37  For an excellent set of arguments to this effect, see D. N. Husak, 'Guns and 
Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the Criminal Sanction,'  23 Law 
and Philosophy (2004), 437–493. 
38 I acknowledge that many would view selling weapons as categorically 
socially undesirable, especially in the context of the Angolan War. I am not 
prepared to follow the first of these arguments, because it denies the importance 
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 Third, causation may also be a practical necessity of proof. A 
system of international criminal responsibility that abolishes 
causation in favor of a structure that makes attempt the 
paradigmatic basis for accountability would face severe difficulties 
accessing relevant mental states. While it is often possible to 
identify the person who has caused a harm, it is markedly more 
difficult to isolate the class of people who entertained criminal 
intentions towards others. Mental states, after all, ‘leave no 
trace.’39 Consequently, demanding proof of causation ensures a 
necessary degree of functional efficiency in the investigation and 
proof of international crimes, while simultaneously preserving the 
private internal life of potential defendants from undue 
encroachment.40 If we aspire to liberal notions of punishment, 
these are salutary characteristics. 
 Fourth, it is unclear to what extent those in the moral-luck 
camp can really wash their hands of causation entirely. Invariably, 
partisans of this theory still demand some action on the part of 
defendants, usually defining it as an act that risks a criminalized 
legal interest.41 Shooting a gun at another person is murder if this 
action coincides with an intention to kill, regardless of whether 
someone actually dies or not. On first blush, this is an astute 
argument, which claims to dispense with causation while still 
guarding against pure thought crimes. And yet, how do we know 
that firing a gun qualifies as an act that increases the risk of 
murder, except by drawing on our experience of the consequences 
of speeding bullets puncturing the human body? We only know 
that firing the gun is a plausible last-act for murder because 
                                                                                                         
of weaponry in legitimate self-defense. Accordingly, I am tempted to think that 
circumstances matter a great deal for the second argument too. 
39 J. M. Fischer & R. H. Ennis, 'Causation and Liability,' 15 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs (1986), 33–40;  See also, V. Tadros. Criminal Responsibility 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2007), at 155; (“Given that what the 
defendant has done cannot be established without considering what the 
defendant has caused, it will be obvious that causation will be relevant to 
determining the criminal responsibility of the defendant.”). 
40 I extrapolate this position from Antony Duff’s argument that privacy and 
autonomy are the primary rationale for why thought crimes are objectionable. 
The addition of a causal element is my own. See A. Duff.  Answering for Crime: 
Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (New York: Hart Publishing, 
2007), at 102–104. I accept, of course, that the requirement of intention still 
requires courts to intrude on the internal lives of defendants. The argument here 
is that causation reduces (but does not eliminate) the dangerousness of this 
artificial but necessary exercise. 
41  For instance, Alexander, Ferzan and Morse reject causation and require a last-
act that unleashes a risk over which the defendant no longer has control. See 
LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: 
A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 197–199 (1 ed. 2009). 
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intuitions derived from causation tell us as much, meaning that 
causation is still doing important normative work no matter if we 
formally repress this reality.42   
 How extensive is the problem of overdetermination then in 
existing international criminal law? Superficially, we might 
anticipate that the difficulty is localized in harm-type crimes, since 
only these make causation a constitutive element of responsibility. 
Lamentably, this is far from true. For accomplices, the 
harm/conduct distinction disappears because the derivative nature 
of the secondary party’s liability creates a cause-like relationship,43 
through which overdetermination again rears its ugly head. 
According to traditional accounts, rape is a conduct-type crime 
(insofar as conduct and not consequence is the quintessence of the 
offence), but assessing whether a supplier of weapons can be 
convicted of rape for providing the weapons used to coerce the 
sexual intrusion demands causation too. How else can we justify 
convicting Bout of this particular war crime, other than by showing 
that his actions made a difference to this conduct of a rapist? Thus, 
we are again vulnerable to the rejoinder that these rapes would 
have happened anyway. 
 Arguably, even the direct perpetration of conduct-type 
offences can be overdetermined if they take place in a context 
where one perpetrator is immediately substitutable for another. If, 
for example, a particular soldier is ordered to rape a male inmate 
within a prisoner of war camp, and duly does so in accordance 
with these orders, is the claim that “it would have happened 
whether I did it or not” not equally available to him where another 
soldier would certainly have taken his place had he refused? This, I 
concede, is controversial because it merges what Anglo-Americans 
describe as overdetermination (the firing squad) with additional or 
pre-emptive causation (someone else would have shot the prisoner 
later had the firing squad not done so). The received wisdom is that 
pre-emptive causation is very different because we never really 
know how events would have transpired otherwise, but this 
position fails to address squarely the moral appeal individuals like 
Bout make to expiate themselves.  
 Similarly, even if these sorts of pre-emptive cases give rise to 
what German theorists frequently discredit as ‘hypothetical 
                                                
42 Viewed in this fashion, the act requirement offered by those who advocate 
abandoning causation looks very similar to what German theorists call adequate 
causation (Adaequanztheorie). This theory emphasizes the generic propensities 
of particular actions. For further details, see below in Part II. 
43 S.H. Kadish, ‘Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of 
Doctrine,’ 73 California Law Review (1985), 323-410, at 323, 327. 
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causation,’44 I doubt whether this criticism is terribly well founded. 
For one reason, causation is always hypothetical. In order to 
determine the responsibility of the serial murderer who allegedly 
kills an old lady with a gun, we must construct an imaginary world 
that is identical to that in which the serial murdered acted as he did, 
minus the squeezing of the trigger. Only this journey into a 
fictitious world allows us to determine whether the serial murderer 
caused the death of victims. So, when ICC Judge Fulford objects 
that determining whether Lubanga made an essential contribution 
to the enlistment of child solders requires ‘a hypothetical 
investigation as to how events might have unfolded without the 
accused’s involvement’,45 the obvious retort is that causation 
always involves this retreat into the imaginary. We are operating in 
hypothetical worlds either way.  
 Instead of belaboring the unavoidably speculative nature of this 
exercise, the better explanation for why pre-emptive causation (e.g. 
Bout) should be distinguished from overdetermination (e.g. 
Dresden pilots) probably flows from assessing causation in a 
minimally different world. In the words of David Lewis, in 
determining whether a particular act or event is a cause of another, 
the fictive world we construct “should be closest to actuality, 
resembling itself more than any other world resembles it.”46 
Consequently, our task should involve subtraction (of the 
defendant’s actions) but not addition (of alternative possible 
actions or events):47 otherwise we are left without any principled 
normative restraint capable of preventing our imaginations from 
running wild. So, the problem of overdetermination is formally 
limited to situations such as Allied pilots bombing Dresden; not 
Bout in Angola. In the former, the alternative Allied pilots were 
also in the air dropping incendiaries over Dresden whereas 
substitutes for Bout would probably have sold weapons through 
other channels, at some later time. 
                                                
44 C. Roxin Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil. Band I: Grundlagen. Der Aufbau der 
Verbrechenslehre (4th edn., Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2006) at 354; K. Kühl, 
Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (6th edn., Vahlen Franz GmbH, 2008), at 23. 
45 Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fulford Judgement, 
Lubanga, supra note 8,  at § 17.  
46 David Lewis, Causation, 70 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 556–567, 560 
(1973). Of course, Lewis later retracted portions of his thinking on 
overdetermined causes, and ultimately reached the position that all pre-emptive 
causes are in fact overdetermined because of minimal relations between pre-
empted and pre-empting causes. See David Lewis, Causation as Influence, 97 
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 182–197, 189 (2000). 
47 My thanks to Thomas Weigend for this point. 
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 Already, these illustrations should leave you feeling slightly 
incredulous. What about pilots who are only over the English 
Channel en route to Dresden, or arms vendors who are pressing 
Angolan warlords to abandon Bout in an attempt to sell them their 
cheaper more damaging weapons systems? The point is that even if 
we can agree that those who merely pre-empt other people from 
committing inevitable crimes do cause international crimes in the 
relevant sense, we are still at pains to ascertain whether a particular 
set of facts is pre-emptive or overdetermined. In fact, these sorts of 
epistemic constraints lead two imminent theorists to perfectly 
contradictory positions about the problem of overdetermination. 
These competing accounts warrant our attention momentarily, 
since they alert us to the epistemic difficulties that await even if we 
are able to resolve first principles.  
 On the one hand, Martin Bunzl famously argues that every 
supposed instance of overdetermination is really an example of 
pre-emptive causation if one looks hard enough. 48 In the case of 
the firing squad, one of the soldiers who shoots at the prisoner 
actually kills her first. Sure, the difference between the first and 
subsequent bullets penetrating the heart may only be a nanosecond, 
but this difference is still significant if we are truly committed to 
constructing minimally different worlds. To extrapolate, even in the 
firestorm that raged over Dresden over those three horrendous 
days, the fire that killed a given child was attributable to a 
particular bomb, dropped by a single pilot with assistance from a 
specific crew, on orders from an individual commander. While it 
might be nigh on impossible to trace these individuals, the 
evidential problem should not corrupt the deeper moral principle. 
 At the end of a distinguished career, David Lewis reached the 
opposite conclusion—for Lewis, pre-emptive causes do not exist 
and causation is always overdetermined.49 To illustrate his thesis, 
Lewis used the example of a two people throwing stones at a glass, 
although the firing squad would have served his purposes perfectly 
too.50 In the stone-throwing example, the first stone hits the glass 
ahead of the second, shattering the object completely. Thus, when 
the second stone arrives at its intended destination, there is simply 
no glass left to break. While many would claim that the first stone 
caused the shattering, Lewis argues that the second stone’s flight 
                                                
48 See M. Bunzl, 'Causal Overdetermination', 76 Journal of Philosophy (1979), 
at 147 (“the illusion of causal overdetermination arises from nothing more than 
the same epistemic constraints that make for difficulties in distinguishing causes 
that preempt other causes.”). 
49 Lewis, supra note 46. 
50 Id. at 188–189. 
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affects that of the first, by minimally influencing the gravitational 
forces operative on it.51 To summarize a more sophisticated 
argument, the event would have been different without the second 
stone. Thus, both throwers caused the harm, even though it would 
have materialized almost identically without either of them. 
 The implications are great. Our four variants of the problem 
suggest that overdetermination arises even as we modulate 
between harm-type or conduct-type crimes these individuals are 
said to have assisted, between the different means of committing 
international crimes across the full panoply of ‘modes of liability,’ 
and within structured organizations as well as mereological groups. 
As such, overdetermination emerges as an acute problem for 
international criminal justice because: causation is a quintessential 
element of responsibility for international crimes in a great many 
contexts; the epistemological difficulties in distinguishing pre-
emptive causes from overdetermined causes are likely to be more 
acute given the factual complexity of international cases, and 
individual perpetrators of international crimes very frequently play 
fungible roles within collective entities that guarantee the crime’s 
commission.  
         
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THEORIES OF CAUSATION 
  
 In order to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
various attempts at solving the problem of overdetermination, we 
must first understand causation tout court. In setting out to acquire 
this understanding, we are immediately struck by a stark 
peculiarity about international criminal law: while “modes of 
liability” may well lay claim to being the most discussed topic 
within the discipline, more fundamental principles such as 
causation attract little to no scholarly attention. Similarly, the only 
real judicial reference to the concept usually reaffirms that 
‘[a]lthough the accused’s conduct need not have been a condition 
sine qua non of the commission of the crime, it must have made a 
difference.’52 As we will explore later, this language is opaque to 
the point of meaninglessness, but in order to understand why, we 
must first explore the competing explanations of cause and effect 
that could underpin this explanation. What is sine qua non 
causation and what are we left with if we discard it? 
                                                
51 Id. at 189. 
52 Kordić, supra note 17 at § 391; Prosecutor v. Blaškić , supra note 17 at § 270 
(“Although it must be proved that the instigation was a clear contributing factor 
to the commission of the crime, it need not be a conditio sine qua non.”). 
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 Most often, causation is understood as a counterfactual 
relationship between two connected events. “But for” event A, 
event B would never have occurred. This understanding springs 
from widely held moral intuitions—the imperative do no harm lies 
at the heart of many visions of moral obligation. We have free rein 
to craft whatever constitutes our own vision of the good life, but 
we remain constrained by the minimalist obligation to ensure that 
we do not bring harm into the world. As Michael Moore explains, 
‘[w]hat gets recorded in our moral ledgers are the bad states of 
affairs that would not have existed but for our actions.’53 And an 
understanding of the natural effects of ‘impacts, blows, and gross 
mechanical movements’ that is instilled in us from a very young 
age normally leaves us with a clear picture that making a 
difference to events matters in determining blame.54 Accordingly, 
whether actions are a sine qua non for criminal harms is the 
dominant yardstick for determining causation. 
 This immediately poses problems. While our primary interest 
lies in situations where the sine qua non assessment leaves too 
much out, the major influence on causal theory stems from the 
test’s failings in the opposite extreme. Counterfactual causation is 
over-inclusive in two dimensions. First, it makes even distant 
conditions of a particular event relevant to responsibility. To cite a 
neat and often-used example, consider the responsibility of a serial 
murderer’s grandmother—but for her decision to procreate the 
better part of a century earlier, the murder of numerous innocents 
would never have transpired at the hands of her progeny.55 But by 
including the grandmother in our account of these gruesome 
crimes, we extend causation beyond the point of plausibility, 
establishing a kind of reductio ad absurdum for the ‘but for’ 
standard that dominates causal theory. 
 Second, coincidences also undermine the merit of ‘but for’ 
causation. In a range of cases, an entirely unforeseeable occurrence 
can derail an actor’s causal influence from its pre-established path. 
If I shoot my estranged lover intending to kill her, but my bullet 
only grazes her leg, am I really responsible for murder when she is 
later killed by a bolt of lightning on the way to the hospital?56 My 
actions are certainly a ‘but for’ condition of her death, and yet the 
                                                
53 Moore, supra note 28, at 317. 
54 H.L.A. Hart and T. Honoré, supra note 26, at 15-16.  
55 J. Stapleton, 'Perspectives on Causation,' in Jeremy Horder ed., Oxford Essays 
in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 67. 
56  For three other interesting variants of this problematic, see J. Feinberg,  Harm 
to Others: the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 2nd edn., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), at 122. 
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result I contributed to bringing about is so attenuated from the 
direct consequences of my own conduct, that blaming me for 
murder seems to miscommunicate events as they really transpired. 
For most, I did not really cause my ex-lover’s death in the 
operative sense, and calling me to answer for these entirely 
anomalous results runs counter to the rationales for causation in 
criminal law that we considered earlier. 
 In response, the most prominent causal theories simply append 
additional limiting criteria to compensate for the overly 
promiscuous ‘but for’ standard. In Anglo-American systems, this 
approach has led to the bifurcation of causation into two conjoint 
elements, namely, cause in fact and legal causation. The first 
allows for a “purely scientific” inquiry on factual grounds based on 
the “but for” standard, thus including the serial murderer’s 
grandmother and my actions leading to my ex-lover’s death by 
lightning. The second evaluative limb excludes these scenarios, 
frequently by somewhat misleadingly describing them as either 
“inadequately proximate” or “too remote.”57 To be sure, a range of 
alternative concepts, from substantial factor to harm-within-the-
risk, claim to achieve this limiting function more fairly,58 but each 
of these exists in the shadows of the more popular notion of 
proximate cause.    
 This duality also exists in orthodox German theory. According 
to the prevalent ‘theory of conditions’ (Bedingungstheorie), all 
conditions are formally equal, making ‘but for’ causation the most 
favored basic test. Instead of a notion of proximate cause or 
remoteness, however, the German tradition constrains the 
overreach of the sine qua non standard by relying on a concept 
called ‘normative attribution’ (objektive Zurechnung).59 Normative 
                                                
57  For a more historical analysis of proximate cause in the Anglo-American 
tradtion, see J.A. McLaughlin 'Proximate Cause,' 39 Harvard Law Review, 149–
199;  for a précis of the abundant criticism of both concepts, see Hart and 
Honoré supra note 15 at 4 (refering to “insufficient proximity” and “too remote” 
as illusions, and citing dicta from the 19th century arguing that both concepts 
merely camouflage the real question of whether it is fair to convict the accused 
in the circumstances). H. Morris, Freedom and Responsibility: Readings in 
Philosophy and Law (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), at 284. 
(discussing the widely held view that proximate cause “is simply a ‘policy 
decision’ disguised as a factual discovery”.). 
58  For an excellent overview and criticism of these various options, see Moore, 
supra note 28 at III (discussing foreseeability, harm-within-the-risk, substantial 
factor and remoteness);  See also, R. Wright 'Causation in Tort Law,' 73 
California Law Review (1985), 1759–1773 (also discussing several theories for 
limiting the scope of sine qua non causation). 
59 C. Roxin Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil. Band I: Grundlagen. Der Aufbau der 
Verbrechenslehre (4th edn., Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2006) at 372; H. 
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attribution filters out causal contributions that were minor, remote, 
unusual or involved third party interventions of a particular 
intensity based on notions of fairness. As one international 
criminal tribunal put it, normative attribution ‘is a means of 
limiting “naturalistic causality.”’60 If one might again protest that, 
like the equivalent concept of legal causation in English-speaking 
systems, these standards are hopelessly vague, the essential point 
for present purposes is that neither legal tradition allows “but for” 
causation free rein—both employ supplementary doctrine out of 
fear that an unbridled concept of “but for” causation will overstep 
what is fair. 
 There is, however, an array of theories that contest these 
cumbersome and ill-defined twin standards. One set of alternatives 
overcomes the imperfections of the “but for” test and its restraining 
partner by disputing the validity of the cause in fact/legal causation 
dichotomy outright. In the English-speaking tradition, H.L.A Hart 
and Tony Honoré authored the most famous attempt of this sort. 
For Hart and Honoré, common sense was the shining light that 
illuminated a defensible understanding of causation and its limits; 
not abstract philosophical, scientific or open-textured principles 
that struggled for concrete articulation. This appeal to common 
sense (to be established through the hypothetical ordinary citizen) 
leads inexorably to the conclusion that the cause of a criminal 
harm is the condition that makes a difference, in that it either 
constitutes a voluntary human act intended to bring about the 
harm, or is an abnormal action, event or condition that is itself the 
real cause of a harm. 
 There is undoubtedly much that commends this explanation. In 
a democratic system where criminal norms purport to put would-be 
defendants on notice of potentially important intrusions on 
individual liberty, the everyday perceptions of citizens matter as 
metrics for defining causation. The great merit of the common 
sense approach, quite apart from simplifying an oftentimes 
spectacularly complex philosophical literature, is that it champions 
the standard a potential criminal would employ.61 And yet, for a 
number of reasons, the common-sense approach has not garnered 
widespread adherence since its academic inception. For one 
                                                                                                         
Koriath, Kausalität und Objektive Zurechnung (1st edn., Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
2007), at 15 (discussing the implications of normative attribution); M. Maiwald 
Kausalität und Strafrecht. Studien zum Verhältnis von Naturwissenschaft und 
Jurisprudenz (Munich: Grundlegend, 1980), at 4-5, 9. 
60 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Orić, (IT-03-68-T), Trial Chamber, 30 June 2006, at 
305. 
61 P.K. Ryu, 'Causation in Criminal Law,' (1958) 106 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 773-805, at 786. 
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reason, if criminal justice uses causation to achieve corrective 
justice (i.e. you account for the harm you caused), justice demands 
“a robustly metaphysical interpretation of cause,”62 not some 
definition that accords with popular perceptions as a matter of 
convenience.  
 Moreover, the common-sense standard of causation does not 
appreciably alter the fluid state of legal causation it was crafted to 
transcend. As Paul Ryu colorfully retorted soon after Hart and 
Honoré’s groundbreaking first edition emerged, ‘common sense 
(or the test applied by the common man) compares with scientific 
thinking as sight estimates size compared with scientific 
measure.’63 So conferring cause a meaning that best suits the clear-
cut resolution of disputes, the need for simplicity or popular 
expectations may have some beneficial sociological consequences, 
but it misspeaks responsibility by trading off the meaning of a 
concept that arguably has a unique metaphysical significance this 
account does not attempt to honor, and ultimately, is no less 
equivocal than the vague notion of legal causation it was invented 
to replace. Others will refute this, of course, but these perceptions 
do explain the very limited purchase of common sense in this field. 
 Other theories of causation attempt different solutions to these 
problems, but they are no more successful in dethroning the 
dominant ‘but for’ test. The theory of adequate causation 
(Adaequanztheorie) is arguably the strongest among these 
contending accounts.  Here, contrary to the individualized 
assessment of causation involved in the “but for” analysis, 
adequate causation is only established where the action in question 
was of a type adequate to produce the harm generated.64 My 
shooting at my ex-lover was not the type of action that was capable 
of producing death by lightning, meaning that my responsibility 
should be limited to that of attempting her murder.65 Whereas ‘but 
for’ causation undertakes causal inquiries one by one in perfect 
hermetic isolation, adequate causation limits this over-reach, 
                                                
62 M. Moore, supra note 27, at 95. But for an excellent criticism of the notion 
that causation has any inherent metaphysical character, see Stephen J. Morse, 
The Moral Metaphysics of Causation and Results, 88 CAL. L. REV. 879 (2000). 
63 Ryu, supra note 61 at 786. 
64 Hart and Honoré, supra note 26 at 411 (introducing adequate causation, 
including the focus on kinds of connections); Ryu, supra note 61 at 791–792 
(also introducing adequate theory of causation). 
65 Note how this circles us back into our earlier debate about whether harm is a 
conceptually meaningful ingredient of responsibility. If it is not, it is hard to 
understand why attempts should be treated as involving lesser responsibility. 
Thus, on my lightning example, some would argue that I am equally responsible 
whether my ex-lover dies by my bullet or an entirely unforeseen electrocution.  
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assessing these issues by deferring to an action’s generic 
propensities.66 I am not responsible for murdering my estranged 
lover because shooting is generally inadequate as a cause of death 
by lightning. 
 But this theory has major shortcomings too. Surely a defendant 
would have to know of typical propensities in order to be fairly 
held responsible for them? As a result, the most popular iteration 
of adequacy theory demands that the accused knew the particular 
factors (ontological knowledge) and the pertinent general laws of 
nature (nomological knowledge).67 Any yet, for many, these 
requirements are unpalatable. By introducing a mental element into 
a test devised to ascertain purely physical phenomena, they 
arguably force distinct concepts into an unhappy union. Thus, with 
certain exceptions, most courts flatly reject the concept because of 
this tendency to pollute the division between physical action and 
guilt.68 This factor alone tends to confirm adequate causation’s 
long-endured place as the underappreciated sibling of the more 
popular ‘but for’ alternative. 
 What then of the concept of efficient causation? Various 
versions of this theory posit that quantitative assessments of 
causation are capable of singling out the one true cause from the 
sea of necessary conditions. For some partisans, the one true cause 
is the last condition in a temporal sequence prior to the prohibited 
result’s manifestation in the world; the preponderant factor that 
‘disrupts the equilibrium between positive and negative 
conditions.’69 Others contend that whatever has the greatest or 
most efficient influence on the result constitutes the cause, denying 
that order in sequence need necessarily constitute the decisive 
factor. To illustrate, if ten blows of precisely the same force are 
necessary to kill a particular prisoner of war, and soldier A delivers 
eight of them before soldier B independently delivers the final two, 
                                                
66  Hart and Honoré, supra note 26 (describing generalized theories of causation 
in the following terms: “They seek rather a general connexion between a 
condition and a subsequent event in the sense of a relation which will hold good 
although the condition is combined with a varying set of other conditions.”). 
67 Ryu, supra note 61 at 791–792. 
68  See in particular, the decision of the German Bundesgerichtshof, (Federal 
Court of Justice) judgment of Sept. 28 1951 in S. v. H. (II. Strafsenat), , 1 
B.G.H.S. at 332. (rejecting adequate causation within German criminal law). For 
other examples of courts adopting the adequacy theory, albeit some time ago, 
see Id. at 792–793; Hart and Honoré, supra note 26 at 417 (setting out various 
continental systems that accepted adequate causation in their criminal or civil 
systems). 
69 K. Binding. Die Normen und ihre übertretung: Eine untersuchung über die 
rechtmässige handlung und die Arten des Delikts (1st edn., Leipzig: Verlag Von 
Wilhelm Engelmann, 1877), at 470. 
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the efficient theory holds soldier A responsible, the preponderant 
theory declares soldier B the cause for making the final difference.  
 And yet, singularizing quantitative theories of causation such 
as these, that attempt to distil the one true cause of an event, seem 
inappropriately narrow for international criminal law. Aside from 
the persistent concern that these theories too are badly 
indeterminate,70 efficient and last-cause understandings of 
causation struggle to make any real sense of the cases that concern 
us here. With respect to the Dresden bombers who are principal 
perpetrators, the many Viktor Bouts of this world who are 
accomplices, and the corporate officers who willingly sustain 
morally bankrupt political regimes who may be either perpetrators 
or accomplices, responsibility cannot be reduced to the act of a 
single agent. In other words, we are committed to the idea that 
responsibility for atrocity is diffused across numerous actors—
masterminds, accomplices and executioners. For international 
crimes then, the quest for a single cause is at odds with our deepest 
intuitions about justice after events as complex as atrocity. Thus, 
we are drawn away from ideas about efficient causes back towards 
the more inclusive concept of ‘but for’ causation that captures all 
these actors. 
 This said, efficient causation is helpful in introducing a slightly 
controversial proposition that has (somewhat mysteriously) 
infiltrated modern international criminal law. The idea is that 
causal contributions must be ‘substantial.’71 At first blush, this 
quantitative vision of causation sits uncomfortably with the theory 
of conditions that underpins the popular “but for” standard. If all 
causes are equal, how are some more potent than others? An action 
is either a cause of an event or it is not, so how do you make a 
substantial contribution when causation is an on or off switch? The 
answer again lies in the notion that not all causes count for 
responsibility—some are too distant, weak or bizarre. So, in 
accordance with metaphysics that view causal relations as scalar, 
                                                
70 Even one of the most ardent advocates of the efficiency theory of causation 
has conceded that precise criteria are not available to filter out efficient from 
non-efficient causes. M. von Buri Die Kausalitat und ihre strafrechtlichen 
Beziehungen (Stuttgart: 1885), at 7-9. 
71 Judgment, Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, (IT-95-14/2-A), Trial Chamber, 17 
December 2004,  § 27 (“it is sufficient to demonstrate that the instigation was a 
factor substantially contributing to the conduct of another...”); Judgment, 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al. (ICTR-99-52-A), 28 November 2007 § 410 
(specifying that genocide and crimes against humanity “require evidence of a 
substantial contrbution.”); Judgment, Prosecutor v. Brima, (SCSL 04-16-T), 20 
June 2007, § 1648 (2007) (requiring a substantial contribution for the purposes 
of planning international crimes). 
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causal force is a variable property of events that can ‘peter out 
gradually by transmission through events.’72  
 Where does modern international criminal law stand on these 
various competing visions of causation? It is still too early to say. 
Frequently, difficult causal problems are simply abandoned under 
the guise of prosecutorial burdens of proof,73 and little is known 
about how courts will address these contradictory explanations in 
trials involving international crimes. Assuming that international 
courts will follow domestic systems’ lead, however, the ‘but for’ 
test would seem likely to infiltrate international criminal 
proceedings, in tandem with an auxiliary concept of normative 
attribution or its equivalent. This likelihood arises from 
international criminal law’s sometimes unconditional deference to 
the position adopted in leading Western municipal systems,74 but it 
will also flow from a desire to assess more than a single strain of 
causal influences on atrocity. Consequently, everything suggests 
that overdetermination, the under-inclusive flipside of ‘but for’ 
causation, is likely to enjoy a long and troublesome life in 
international criminal justice. 
   
IV. THE PROBLEM OF OVERDETERMINATION AND ITS SOLUTIONS 
  
Let us begin our exploration of possible solutions for the 
overdetermination problem by recapitulating the various examples 
with which we began. In the first, the fire bombing of Dresden by 
close to 8,000 Allied pilots provided a paradigmatic illustration 
closest to the firing-squad motif. As part of this aerial campaign, 
no individual pilot made a difference to the firestorm that would 
have resulted without their token contribution. Put differently, we 
can subtract the contribution of each and every pilot in a trial for 
say crimes against humanity as counterfactual causation would 
demand, but this leaves us with the implausible result that these 
                                                
72 Moore, supra note 27 at 224. Another nice description Moore employs is that 
causation “tires” through its links. See Id, at 102. 
73 In one instance, for example, an individual named Gotovac died in a Bosnian 
concentration camp as the result of two separate beatings. The accused 
participated in the first, but not the second. Conceivably, the accused produced 
wounds that accelerated death once the second spate of violence commenced. 
The second beating could also have been so vicious that Gotovac would have 
died irrespective of whether the first too place or not. These sorts of scenario 
would give rise to neat problems in causation, but they were circumvented by 
pointing to the failure to prove causation.  
74  For a series of instances where international criminal law uncritically absorbs 
doctrine from prominent Western systems, see Stewart, supra note 3. 
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crimes are the fault of no one. This, as we have seen, highlights 
how the actions of even those personally perpetrating crimes can 
be overdetermined in the relevant sense—the problem is not 
limited to accomplices on any plausible rendering. 
 Thomas Lubanga offered a second potential variation on this 
truth, even if some would contest his inclusion here. If Lubanga’s 
defence is true, then his involvement in the recruitment of 
Congolese child soldiers was arguably overdetermined too, even 
though he is also probably best described as a perpetrator not an 
accomplice. To recall, Lubanga argues that the members of the 
rebel group he represented did not ‘need him to carry out these 
crimes.’75 I accept that some would describe this as pre-emptive 
causation i.e. Lubanga completed the crime before someone else, 
so you cannot assimilate this to the firing-squad metaphor. But 
even if we take seriously the idea that we are only to construct a 
minimally different world to test what would have happened 
without a defendant’s conduct, “one should not erroneously infer 
that [various tests for causation] will blind us to the causal role of 
dispositions or inclinations.”76 If others had inclinations to fill 
Lubanga’s shoes, might his conduct not be overdetermined?  
 The actions of businesspeople in apartheid South Africa were 
doubly overdetermined. On one level, a robust global market 
makes the acts of any one company in the apartheid regime 
fungible for other companies would willingly play this role if any 
one corporation defects. On a second level, a single vote on a 
corporate board of, say, fifteen members seldom makes a 
difference to the actions of the company. If a company’s board 
passed a motion to assist apartheid crimes by a bare minimum (i.e. 
8 votes to 7 in this hypothetical), then each board member who 
cast an affirmative vote did make a difference to the downstream 
consequences, but in any other voting configuration, the company 
would have acted as it did regardless of any individual vote. How 
then do we hold these businesspeople responsible, when almost no 
consequence can be pinned on any individual using the prevalent 
understanding of causation? 
 Viktor Bout offers a slight variation on this theme. In the case 
of businesses operating in apartheid South Africa, the willing 
substitutes are numerous and barriers to entry marginal. In Viktor 
Bout’s case, he forms part of a much smaller group of individuals 
who would or could run weapons to Angola in the midst of this 
bloodshed (for reasons that become apparent further below). 
                                                
75 Defence Closing Statements (Open Session), Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-T-
357), Trial Chamber I, August 26, 2011, § 30, lines 2-5. 
76 MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE QUALITY OF FREEDOM 278 (2008). 
2012] OVERDETERMINED ATROCITIES 26 
   
Moreover, ascertaining whether someone else would have filled 
this role is more speculative in Bout’s case, given the extent of 
these impediments. For these reasons, Bout’s argument that ‘If I 
didn’t do it, someone else would,”’77 falls within the rubric of pre-
emptive causation, and contravenes our minimally different world 
test. Nonetheless, if his contribution is neutral in consequentialist 
terms in that others would have done more or less identically, we 
are still left with the vexing task of justifying his responsibility for 
international crimes that require causation. Moreover, these issues 
not only arise in formal organizations; Bout shows how they are 
salient for mereological groups such as arms vendors that have no 
joint agenda. 
 Jonathan Glover makes the task of justifying accountability in 
these contexts even harder still. In a beautiful articulation of the 
scale of the ethical dilemma (that coincidentally uses arms 
manufacturers and businesses in apartheid as illustrations), he 
questions whether it is really safe to claim that overdetermined 
contributions are neutral in consequentialist terms.78 The problem 
is much worse. The side effects of declining to participate in evil 
may bring an added set of negative consequences, without 
impacting upon the advent of the atrocity. To return to Dresden, 
the Allied pilots whose troubled consciences led them to drop their 
ordinance over vacant fields outside the city rather than participate 
in the horror could have faced court martial, loss of earnings for 
their family, or major impediments to their careers over the longer 
term. If the massacre at Dresden was going to unfold anyway, 
would these side effects not favor participation absent an ability to 
actually make a difference to the atrocity?   
 This is surely sobering. The reasoning implies that if we cannot 
point to a meaningful difference our conduct would make relative 
to massive harm, and a set of countervailing side effects favor 
implicating oneself to at least avoid these peripheral negativities, 
the only reason to refuse participating in evil might derive from a 
strange sort of narcissistic pride.79 So to place this set of reflections 
back into the context of modern international criminal law, the 
                                                
77 Schmidle, supra note 13.  
78 J. Glover & M. J. Scott-Taggart, 'It Makes no Difference Whether or Not I Do 
It,' 49 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, (1975), 
171–209. 
79 I accept, however, that someone who chose to participate would have to live 
the rest of his days with the psychological impact of knowing that she personally 
did these things, which would likely be a massive psychic cost. For evidence of 
this, see the testimony of various Dresden pilots cited in Kutz, who reflected 
many years later that “I expect no mercy in the life to come.” Kutz, supra note 
1, p 120-122. 
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major conceptual problem in the famed Erdemović case (where 
other executioners threatened the life of a fellow soldier who did 
not wish to participate in the execution of thousands of men and 
boys at Srebrenica) is less whether international law afforded 
Erdemović a defense of duress,80 and more whether criminal law 
could justifiably hold him responsible for causing crimes that 
would have certainly transpired regardless. In Glover’s terms, even 
minor negative side effects could favor participation in these 
inevitable crimes, even though they create pressures that are well 
short of duress.     
 To date, international criminal justice has offered only a 
shallow treatment of these disquieting problems. Most frequently, 
the only real engagement is tacit, when international courts repeat 
the refrain that ‘[a]lthough the accused’s conduct need not have 
been a condition sine qua non of the commission of the crime, it 
must have made a difference.’81 As I suggested earlier, this 
language lacks any appreciable meaning. If the phrase implies that 
a theory of causation other than ‘but for’ causation better explains 
the relationship between action and result in international criminal 
justice, courts should announce which less popular theory of 
causation is doing the hidden causal work. As I argued in Part II, 
there are compelling reasons why sine qua non is the dominant test 
for causation in theory and practice almost everywhere, not to 
mention strong grounds for its retention in international criminal 
justice in particular. If international courts are going to stray from 
this path, they should at least announce as much and elect one of 
the competing theories we have considered.  
 Alternatively, if this language implies that there is some way of 
making a difference to something without causing it, the test fails 
for other reasons. First, it unjustifiably dispenses with causation, 
when this concept is made necessary by the definition of 
international crimes. In Part I, we saw that causation is a pre-
requisite for responsibility in international criminal justice because 
international criminal law creates harm-type offenses, and because 
secondary parties often bear causal relations to the physical 
perpetrators of conduct-type offenses they assist. One cannot 
                                                
80  For the very best exemplars of an extensive literature dealing with Erdemović 
under the rubric of duress, see Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism, and 
Proportionality, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 741 (2008); Rosa Ehrenreich 
Brooks, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity & Duress, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 
861 (2002); Alexander K. A. Greenawalt, Pluralism of International Criminal 
Law, The, 86 IND. L.J. 1063 (2011). 
81 Kordić, supra note 17 at § 391; Prosecutor v. Blaškić , supra note 17 at § 270 
(“Although it must be proved that the instigation was a clear contributing factor 
to the commission of the crime, it need not be a conditio sine qua non.”). 
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discard causation in these contexts without miscommunicating 
what it means to be responsible for an international crime, so if the 
standard test means that causation is not required, it creates an 
expressive contradiction.  
 Second, making a difference without causing something is 
logically nonsensical since “there is no way of contributing to any 
result, directly or indirectly, except causally.”82 So even if we 
overlooked this test’s first infidelity to the international crimes 
with which it partners, this second flaw confirms that the approach 
is more a smokescreen to prevent detection than a good-faith 
philosophical attempt at accounting for the moral problem. On 
either reading of this language, then, the test fails to offer a 
position that is commensurate with the challenge that 
overdetermined causes pose for international criminal justice as a 
discipline. This realization should spark better solutions for a 
problem of this importance, if we are to apply principles of blame 
attribution that are justified not intuitive, arbitrary and illiberal.  
 Perhaps domestic criminal systems offer better solutions? 
Unfortunately, I fear not. In both Anglo-American and German 
systems, the preferred strategy for dealing with overdetermined 
causes modifies counterfactual causation by assessing events as 
they actually transpired.83 The supposition is that the harms in 
Angola or before the metaphorical firing squad can be defined in a 
sufficiently precise way that the sorts of difficulties 
overdetermination engenders simply dissolve. In the words of John 
Mackie, ‘[w]hat we accept as causing each result, though not 
necessary in the circumstances for that result described in some 
broad way, was necessary in the circumstances for the result as it 
came about.’84 So, we should not evaluate whether our prisoner up 
against a brick wall would have died but for the actions of any one 
soldier in the firing squad; the question is, would she have died as 
she did?  
                                                
82 Gardner, supra note 27, at 443. 
83 Hart and Honoré, supra note 26, at 117-119 (discussing what they describe as 
additional causes, and the need for assessing sine qua non based on events that 
occurred “in this particular way”); K. J. M. Smith, A Modern Treatise on the 
Law of Criminal Complicity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),  at 84 
(“the sine qua non condition is concerned with an event’s exact occurrence, 
including time, place, extent and type of harm, and so on.”); For the German 
equivalent, which assesses the result in its concrete figure (“Erfolg in seiner 
konkreten Gestalt”), see H. Koriath, Kausalität und objektive Zurechnung. (1st 
edn., Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), at 145; Roxin, supra note 59, at 359. 
84 J.L Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1980), at 46, (emphasis in original). 
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 Alas, this solution does not work either. First, by adopting an 
understanding of causation based on events as they actually took 
place, we would have to describe a woman who paints a vase blue 
before someone else smashes it as a cause of the vase’s 
destruction.85 After all, if the painter had not done as she did, the 
event would not have occurred as it took place, since the shattered 
pieces of porcelain left on the floor would be an entirely different 
color.86 The implications of this objection are broad—the 
manufacturer of the t-shirt our prisoner is wearing when executed 
by the firing squad becomes a cause of the death,87 since the event 
would have materialized quite differently after subtracting the 
clothing through which the bullet passed in the death that really 
took place. 
 Second, if as it took place includes a temporal component, 
everything is causally relevant to everything else. For example, it 
we offer a fine-grained account of Viktor Bout’s complicity in 
atrocities that took place in Angola, a key property of the event 
was that they transpired in 1992. But time is a relational property 
of events, making Bout’s criminally indifferent actions in Angola 
and every prior event causally linked. Consequently, Boris Becker 
was a causal contribution for Bout’s crimes in Angola too, since 
his inaugural win at Wimbledon in 1985 had a precise temporal 
relationship with the fine-grained explanation of how Bout’s 
crimes took place seven years later.88 So in resorting to the fine-
grained explanation of causation to overcome the shortcomings in 
the sine qua non theory of causation, we collapse into a standard 
whose breadth is without limit. 
                                                
85 L. Traeger, Der Kausalbegriff im Straf- und Zivilrecht (Marburg, 1929). Claus 
Roxin later attempts to explain away this example, by arguing that the painting 
was not relevant for the time, place and way of the execution of the legal 
element of the crime. I find this unconvincing, since it introduces a different 
notion of relevant causation; Roxin, supra note 59, at 359, marginal no. 21. For 
more on the theory of relevant causation (Relevanztheorie) and its shortcomings, 
see Ryu, supra note 61, p. 793-796. 
86 L. Traeger, supra note 85. 
87 I borrow this example from I. Puppe, ‘Naturalismus un Normativismus in der 
modernen Strafrechtsdogmatik,’ 141 Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht 
(1994), 297-301. Puppe offers an attractive solution, which goes unconsidered in 
the English-speaking literature, by arguing that causation should be seen as “a 
detrimental modification of the legally protected interest.“ But for criticism of 
this position too, see E. Hilgendorf, ‘Zur Lehre vom Erfolg in seiner konkreten 
Gestalt,’ 142 Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (1995) 527  
88  Michael Moore uses Princess Diana’s death to illustrate this argument, but I 
draw on a historical figure with whom I am more enamored. Moore, supra note 
27, at 414.  
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 Third, a range of authors from different traditions object that 
the harm as it took place standard already posits the solution that 
causal inquiry exists to provide. In the German tradition, Friedrich 
Dencker concludes that using the concrete result adopts a condition 
for the description of the event that one already is certain about, 
which he rightly rejects as a circularity.89 Similarly, in addressing 
the firing-squad example explicitly, Christopher Kutz argues that 
‘[t]he trouble with this approach is that by identifying effects by 
their causes, it solves questions of overdetermination by 
tautology.’90 Each of these criticisms plays off the fact that we do 
not include the manufacturer of the t-shirt the prisoner was wearing 
at the moment of execution because we believe it causally 
irrelevant, but this impermissibly assumes the answer that we look 
to causation to provide. 
 Ultimately, the various criticisms of harm as it took place alert 
us to a remarkable three-way convergence among purportedly 
conflicting accounts of criminal responsibility. In the first instance, 
the fine-grained solution to overdetermination that assesses harm 
as it actually took place is so broad as to make causation an 
irrelevance in assigning responsibility. If Boris Becker’s first win 
at Wimbledon is a causal factor in Viktor Bout’s responsibility for 
international crimes in Angola, causation loses all meaning as an 
ingredient in responsibility. This, ironically, coincides with the 
conclusion Christopher Kutz reaches after admonishing causation’s 
inability to cope with overdetermined causes—in both instances, 
causation plays no part.91 To complete the curious merger, these 
approaches also coincide with arguments that moral luck interdicts 
causation in the criminal law as a blanket rule. Although each of 
these approaches differ, their implication is identical—causation 
does no work in assigning responsibility for overdetermined 
harms. 
 This exposes a deep schizophrenia in international criminal 
justice. As things stand, the dominant theory for establishing 
responsibility for overdetermined causes in international justice is 
at odds with core commitments. Each of the arguments for 
                                                
89 F. Dencker, Kausalität und Gesamttat (1st edn., Munich: Duncker & Humblot, 
1996), at 106-107. In this spirit, see also Eric Hilgendorf, Zur Lehre von “Erfolg 
in seiner konkreten Gestalt,' 142 Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht (1995), 
515-524 (arguing that the “concrete result” is without fixed outline and 
indeterminate.). 
90 Kutz, supra note 1 at 285, footnote 33. Wright, supra note 58 at 1777–1778 
(also describing the attempt to describe the effort to detail the manner of 
occurrence for purposes of calculating causation as tautology). 
91 Christopher Kutz, Causeless complicity, 1 CRIMINAL LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 
289–305 (2007). 
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maintaining harm as a ground of liability finds a counterpoint in 
the intricacies of overdetermination. First, the evidential point 
about mental states ‘leaving no trace’ is clearly inapposite for 
overdetermined cases, since ex hypothesi there is no necessary 
correlation between result and any one individual’s actions in these 
circumstances. And second, to some extent, feelings of remorse 
can be assuaged by Lubanga’s countervailing sense that ‘I wasn’t 
needed for the crime,’ or even more problematically, the 
knowledge that the world is better off that this inevitable evil came 
into being through me.  
 This said, someone is surely responsible for the Dresden 
firebombing! Participation in atrocity is surely sufficient, and the 
cases of Bout, Lubanga, Dresden pilots, and businesspeople in 
apartheid corroborate this moral intuition with spectacular 
intensity. Perhaps, then, instead of throwing up our hands in 
surrender to the incoherence of standards domestic courts tolerate 
or prematurely amputating the infected concept entirely, 
international criminal courts should seek out new explanations for 
what it means to cause an atrocity. In the context of their work, this 
would mean discarding the hopelessly hollow statement 
‘[a]lthough the accused’s conduct need not have been a condition 
sine qua non of the commission of the crime, it must have made a 
difference,’92 in favor of a more robust holistic theory of causation 
that better accounts for individual agency within collective 
structures.  
 For some, this theory is already on offer. In recent years, a 
theory called necessary element of a sufficient set (NESS) has 
gained ascendancy in modern English-speaking systems, precisely 
because of its perceived success in resolving the overdetermination 
riddle. This particular theory was originally introduced by Hart and 
Honoré on the backs of Hume and John Stuart Mill, but later 
expanded and popularized by Richard Wright.93 The formal 
definition of NESS that “a particular condition was a cause of 
(condition contributing to) a specific consequence if and only if it 
was a necessary element of a set of antecedents actual conditions 
that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence.”94 The 
key word in all this is “actual”. In the case of the Dresden 
bombers, each pilot made a necessary contribution to a sufficient 
                                                
92  Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, supra note 17 at 391; Prosecutor v. Blaškić , 
supra note 17 at 270 (“Although it must be proved that the instigation was a 
clear contributing factor to the commission of the crime, it need not be a 
conditio sine qua non.”). 
93 Wright, supra note 58. 
94 Wright, supra note 58 at 1782. 
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set of antecedent conditions that produced the actual firestorm. In 
essence, they all caused these murders by acting in unison. 
 What about the board members of companies in apartheid 
South Africa? To recall, according to the “but for” evaluation, any 
vote within a board other than a bare majority (i.e. 8 out of 15 
votes) creates serious problems of causal overdetermination—each 
board member could rightly argue that her contribution in voting to 
do business with an apartheid government made no difference to 
that outcome. Under the NESS analysis, however, a vote of say 14 
affirmative votes involves 14 distinct contributions to the actual 
set of conditions sufficient to propel the company into a role in 
sustaining a system of institutionalized racism.95 So, claim 
adherents, NESS causation ably accounts for the Dresden-type 
harm where joint action produces an exact quantum of harm as 
well as overdetermined participation in voting structures where 
harm presupposes the attainment of a particular threshold. NESS 
factors thus appear to outperform their more established 
predecessor. 
 And yet NESS would treat Bout and Lubanga differently. In 
both these instances, the NESS analysis purportedly excludes these 
types of argument on the familiar distinction between pre-emptive 
and truly overdetermined causes, without explaining why this 
distinction is operative or how we go about distinguishing between 
them. In the case of Thomas Lubanga, it may well have been true 
that the militia that recruited child soldiers into their ranks did not 
need him for that purpose and that his contribution to the enterprise 
was less than essential, but the supposition is that this requires 
more than a minimal imaginary world. As Richard Wright would 
argue, “[t]he potential actions of others that did not in fact occur 
could not be a part of any set of actual antecedent conditions that 
was sufficient for the injury.”96 The evil did come through 
Lubanga, and yet NESS theorists still leave us guessing why this 
should be normatively important if the disposition of others 
confirm that someone else would certainly have taken his place.  
 How would a NESS factor function in international criminal 
law? For all its possible advantages, I also fear a collapse into a 
familiar indeterminacy. The real work NESS does involves 
drawing boundaries around sufficient sets of conditions, then 
holding anyone accountable (subject to other elements of blame 
attribution) who participated in this set. In cases involving massive 
                                                
95  Wright, like many others, uses pollution cases to illustrate this phenomenon 
but the principles are easily transposable to corporate boards. See Id. at 1792–
1794. 
96 Id. at 1795. 
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social upheaval, the prospects for massive sufficient sets for crimes 
that are dependent on broad collective participation are very real. 
In fact, this has proved one of the central points of contention 
around joint criminal enterprise in international criminal justice: 
sure, one can say an entire army of soldiers, government 
representatives and political supporters were engaged in a joint 
criminal enterprise,97 but at some point people begin to fear this 
means ‘just convict everyone.’98 Two examples demonstrate 
comparable difficulties for NESS causation. 
 First, the war ICC indictee Thomas Lubanga was fighting in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo was motivated and fuelled by 
the illegal exploitation of natural resources by Western 
companies.99 At a particular point, the closure of an industrial plant 
in Australia made the Eastern DRC the only place in the world 
where the mineral coltan could be extracted. This mineral, which is 
essential in laptop computers, game consoles and cellphones, is 
readily harvested by artisanal minerals, making it an ideal means 
of financing atrocity in the post-Cold War world. Immediately 
prior to Christmas in 2001, the demand for next generation 
electronics in Western markets saw prices in the region Thomas 
Lubanga operated rise 1000%, sparking a massive increase in 
atrocities as warring factions vied for dominance over extractive 
sites.100 Does this market in pillaged commodities, which is 
dependent on a very large sufficient set of willing Western 
consumers, make these consumers responsible for the resulting 
crimes?101 
 Second, the reason Viktor Bout was so unrepentantly selling 
weapons to every brutal regime on the earth for more than a 
decade, was because Western governments supported him in the 
                                                
97  For a synopsis of very broad joint criminal enterprises, see Alison Marston 
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise,  
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 75–169 (2005). 
98 Mohamed Elewa Badar, “Just Convict Everyone!” Joint Perpetration: From 
Tadić to Stakić and Back Again, 6 INT. CRIM. L. R. 293–302 (2006). 
99 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, UN Doc. S/2001/357 (2001), 12 April 2001. 
100 J. Cuvelier and T. Raeymaekers, Supporting the War Economy in the DRC: 
European Companies and the Coltan Trade, International Peace Information 
Service, January 2002, available at 
http://www.ipisresearch.be/publications_detail.php?id=197&lang=en (visited 20 
June 2012). 
101  For an overview of the law governing pillage of natural resources, see JAMES 
G. STEWART, CORPORATE WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING PILLAGE OF NATURAL 
RESOURCES (2010). 
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endeavor. The motivation for their collaboration was obvious; 
when they had to transfer weapons covertly on the grey market, 
they depended on established black-market dealers such as Bout to 
give their covert transfers the clandestine veneer necessary.102 In a 
democratic system like the United States (to name only one of 
Bout’s trusted supporters), the decision of political leaders to 
support someone such as Bout despite his actions in Angola might 
implicate a massive sufficient set of all American citizens who 
voted for these political representatives.103 Without this sufficient 
set’s vote, the leaders could not have acted thus, and Bout would 
have enabled the murder of fewer Africans.104 Is this, after all, so 
far from the example of corporate board members in Apartheid 
South Africa, just with membership of the board expanded 
exponentially?  
 To bring this back into our earlier analysis of causation, the 
NESS factor became popular because it dispensed with the need to 
show that anyone involved in a crime made a necessary 
contribution to that offense, and it proudly brushed aside the need 
for a ‘substantial contribution’ on the assured ground that the 
‘necessary element of a sufficient set formula is the essence of the 
concept of causation.’105 Indeed, in an essay I would highly 
recommend to all and sundry, Derek Parfit invites us to accept that 
those who make imperceptibly small contributions to joint harm 
are still responsible for that harm when operating in collective 
constructs.106 In essence, he incites international criminal lawyers 
to do away with the need for a ‘substantial contribution.’ And yet, 
if international criminal law has anything to contribute to these 
theories, it is that the extrapolation of garden-variety principles 
onto the international stage in an increasing interdependent global 
                                                
102 R. Stohl, D. Smith, and M. Schroeder, The Small Arms Trade: A Beginner’s 
Guide, (London: One World, 2007), at 15-17 (using Bout as an illustration of the 
ways in which governments use black-market dealers within the covert grey 
market). 
103  For a wonderful exploration of citizen responsibility for war crime in Iraq, 
albeit one that is founded on citizenship not causation, see Amy Sepinwall, 
Citizen Responsibility and the Reactive Attitudes: Blaming Americans for War 
Crimes in Iraq, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR COLLECTIVE WRONGDOING 231–260 
(Tracy Isaacs & Richard Vernon eds., 2011). 
104 I use the verb murder advisedly even though Bout was an accomplice, to 
reiterate that accomplices are held responsible for the crime their actions assist. 
105 Wright, supra note 58 at 1805; for an important criticism of this view, and all 
other theories of causation, in that they overlook the perspectival character of 
causal analyses, see Stapleton, supra note 34 at 66; For a response to Stapleton, 
see Tadros, supra note 39 at 159–164. 
106 D. Parfit, Chapter 3: Five Problems of Moral Mathematics, Reasons and 
Persons (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp 67 – 87. 
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society casts a very wide net. Thus, our solution for 
overdetermination risks serious over-inclusion, drawing us back 
into the opposite set of problems that inhere in causation.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Overdetermination poses serious problems for international 
criminal justice, where the individual agency upon which criminal 
responsibility depends tends to diminish in direct proportion to the 
scale of mass violence. Accordingly, a coherent explanation of the 
relationship between responsibility and overdetermined causes is a 
pressing issue for international criminal justice, if responsibility is 
to be based on principle not discretion. Despite this, causation in 
general and overdetermination in particular have escaped sustained 
discussion within the discipline, as we theorists expend an undue 
amount of energy on ‘modes of liability’ that are less fundamental 
next to basic understandings of cause and effect. Although this 
essay has sought to begin a new discussion about overdetermined 
causation rather than offer any definite solution, several practical 
and conceptual implications are immediately apparent at this early 
stage. 
First, the standard test that is used as a refrain in 
international judgments, that ‘[a]lthough the accused’s conduct 
need not have been a condition sine qua non of the commission of 
the crime, it must have made a difference,’107 is at best unhelpful 
and at worst fundamentally incoherent. In either case, the phrase 
obscures the real moral and legal principles at issue here, which go 
to the heart of any attempt to hold individuals to account for moral 
wrongdoing within systemic campaigns of violence. Consequently, 
more must be said about causation, better defenses of the dominant 
fine-grained account of ‘but for’ causation offered, and greater 
investigation of NESS theories explored, in order to arrive at a 
more principled position than that presently on offer in 
international criminal trials. Without these, modern trials depend 
upon faith rather than justifiable principle. 
 Second, I do not believe that making ‘an essential contribution’ 
is a normatively principled means of assigning blame to any type 
of participant in international crimes. As we have seen, the ICC 
has recently followed German criminal theory in concluding that 
                                                
107  Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, supra note 17 at 391; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, 
supra note 17 at 270. (“Although it must be proved that the instigation was a 
clear contributing factor to the commission of the crime, it need not be a 
conditio sine qua non.”). 
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co-perpetration requires an agreement with others coupled with an 
essential contribution in the sense of being able to frustrate the 
commission of the crime. And yet few international crimes involve 
“essential” contributions of this sort, as even the firing-squad 
example shows. None of the Dresden pilots or board members of 
Western companies in apartheid made essential contributions, but 
they jointly perpetrated crimes for which they should be called to 
account. This is true of crimes perpetrated within organizations 
that have shared goals within well-defined structures, as well as in 
mereological groups that are only a chance assembly of disparate 
agents who are acting similarly. 
Third, collective responsibility is not an adequate solution 
to the problem. True, if one does not share the widespread 
misgivings with corporate criminal liability,108 we could hold 
companies operating in apartheid accountable by deploying 
corporate criminal liability. Instead of worrying about individual 
contributions by boardmembers, the corporation itself becomes our 
target. But notice how this does not immediately extend to the 
other organizations we have considered; holding Thomas 
Lubanga’s rebel group responsible, criminally or otherwise, is not 
an obvious option. More acutely, our appeal to collective 
responsibility struggles to account for the mereological group of 
independent arms vendors such as Bout, who share no joint 
characteristics, structure or identity. And in any event, collective 
responsibility cannot excuse individuals.  
Fourth, it is too early to concede that individual criminal 
responsibility is structurally incapable of accounting for the 
collective nature of most international crimes. Before arriving at 
that conclusion, we must wrestle with the unwieldy problem that is 
overdetermination with much greater zeal. To be sure, the 
foregoing suggests that the challenge is significant, but the 
problem of overdetermination resonates with our deepest sense of 
                                                
108 For criticisms, See V. S Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What 
Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1477–1534 (1996); John 
Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1329 (2009); Richard A. Epstein, Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law of Unconstitutional 
Conditions, in A.S. and R.E. Barkow (eds), PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: 
USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 38–61 (2011). For 
arguments pointing out the retributive justification for and practical utility of 
corporate criminal liability, see Samuel W Buell, The Blaming Function of 
Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473 (2006); Brent Fisse & John 
Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW 468–
513 (1988); Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, 
(Keith Hylton & Alon Harel eds.). 
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what it means to participate in atrocity and therefore requires a 
robust conceptual solution. I suspect, for instance, that at least part 
of what Hannah Arendt famously calls “the banality of evil” is that 
terrible violence often involves playing a consequentially benign 
part in a wider horror that would take place regardless of one’s 
participation;109 what makes radical evil so banal is that the most 
terrible individual actions frequently make no discernable 
difference. 
Moreover, overdetermination should leave us asking 
uncomfortable questions of ourselves; it is the central moral 
problem of our time. In a globalized society where markets enable 
atrocities, we all make utterly banal contributions to international 
crimes: by buying diamond jewelry that provides an important 
means of financing unspeakable bloodshed; purchasing all range of 
electronics that almost certainly contain other conflict resources; 
flying airplanes whose manufacturers use our fares to subsidize 
their production of weapons systems that ultimately find their way 
into the hands of brutal warlords; and by buying low-cost clothing 
we know was produced in subhuman conditions. We rightly tell 
ourselves that we do not personally make a difference to these 
atrocities; but that is hardly the point. In the end, we are left with 
the unsettling sense that participating in atrocity is terrifyingly 
normal. 
 
     
  
   
                                                
109 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1992). 
